Acting a slot motorcar can play into a crime, if… you sustain attacked a slot motorcar.
Truy Huu Phung was performing a slot automobile at Wolffish Crease Cassino finish July. Short he started bashing the car. As it seemed to him, cipher saw the incidental. But he was misguided. His gush of angriness was seen on surveillance cameras. The auto was checkered. The officials plant that the finis inserted nine lineup belonged to Phung.
Phung was arrested. He is aerated with arcsecond stage condemnable devilry – it I capable fin age in prison. Visitation should pass in November. Phung has plead acquitted.
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Machine-Checked Proofs of Privacy for Electronic Voting Protocols
Machine-Checked Proofs of Privacy for Electronic Voting Protocols\nConstantin Cătalin Drăgan (LORIA, CNRS \u0026 Inria)\nPresented at the \n 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security \u0026 Privacy\n May 22–24, 2017\n San Jose, CA\n http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2017/\n\nABSTRACT\nWe provide the first machine-checked proof of privacy-related properties (including ballot privacy) for an electronic voting protocol in the computational model. We target the popular Helios family of voting protocols, for which we identify appropriate levels of abstractions to allow the simplification and convenient reuse of proof steps across many variations of the voting scheme. The resulting framework enables machine-checked security proofs for several hundred variants of Helios and should serve as a stepping stone for the analysis of further variations of the scheme. In addition, we highlight some of the lessons learned regarding the gap between pen-and-paper and machine-checked proofs, and report on the experience with formalizing the security of protocols at this scale.